Inclusive growth: the case of Germany by Schmid, Günther
www.ssoar.info
Inclusive growth: the case of Germany
Schmid, Günther
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Schmid, G. (2018). Inclusive growth: the case of Germany. (IZA Policy Paper, 139). Bonn: IZA Forschungsinstitut zur
Zukunft der Arbeit GmbH. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-65897-4
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
econstor
Make Your Publications Visible.
A Service of
zbw Leibniz-InformationszentrumWirtschaftLeibniz Information Centrefor Economics
Schmid, Günther
Working Paper
Inclusive growth: The case of Germany
IZA Policy Paper, No. 139
Provided in Cooperation with:
IZA – Institute of Labor Economics
Suggested Citation: Schmid, Günther (2018) : Inclusive growth: The case of Germany, IZA
Policy Paper, No. 139, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/180634
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen
Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle
Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich
machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.
Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen
(insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten,
gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort
genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.
Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your
personal and scholarly purposes.
You are not to copy documents for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them
publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise
use the documents in public.
If the documents have been made available under an Open
Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you
may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated
licence.
www.econstor.eu
POLICY PAPER SERIES
IZA Policy Paper No. 139
Günther Schmid
Inclusive Growth: The Case of Germany
JUNE 2018
Any opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in this series may 
include views on policy, but IZA takes no institutional policy positions. The IZA research network is committed to the IZA 
Guiding Principles of Research Integrity.
The IZA Institute of Labor Economics is an independent economic research institute that conducts research in labor econom-
ics and offers evidence-based policy advice on labor market issues. Supported by the Deutsche Post Foundation, IZA runs the 
world’s largest network of economists, whose research aims to provide answers to the global labor market challenges of our 
time. Our key objective is to build bridges between academic research, policymakers and society.
IZA Policy Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should 
account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author.
Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 5–9
53113 Bonn, Germany
Phone: +49-228-3894-0
Email: publications@iza.org www.iza.org
IZA – Institute of Labor Economics
POLICY PAPER SERIES
IZA Policy Paper No. 139
Inclusive Growth: The Case of Germany
JUNE 2018
Günther Schmid
WZB Berlin Social Science Centre, Free University of Berlin and IZA
ABSTRACT
IZA Policy Paper No. 139 JUNE 2018
Inclusive Growth: The Case of Germany1
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the right to decent work (RDW) in the digital economy. This reasoning is in blunt opposition 
to the current mood of giving up this right in favour of an unconditional basic income (UBI). 
The study starts by briefly expanding the basic argument and by defining the principles of 
inclusive versus exclusive growth (1); a comprehensive overview of German labour market 
policy and labour law reforms since the beginning of this millennium assesses to what 
extent Germany is pursuing these principles, accompanied by selective evidence of their 
consequences for the German labour market performance (2); a stylised and descriptive 
overview of the inclusive impact of these reforms in quantitative and qualitative terms 
follows, with an essay reflecting the concept of the inclusive labour contract (3).
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Introduction 
The argument I would like to bring forward is that inclusive growth appears to be 
the only suitable strategy for realising the right to decent work (RDW) in the 
digital economy. This reasoning is in blunt opposition to the current mood of 
giving up this right in favour of an unconditional basic income (UBI). The RDW 
has three advantages over UBI: First, the RDW corresponds to the most important 
and universally accepted principles of ethics, whereas UBI has some important 
flaws in this respect; second, the RDW is a realistic and evolutionary reform 
perspective, whereas UBI is an unrealistic and disruptive utopia; and third, the 
RDW, through inclusive growth, promises to combine equity with efficiency 
whereas UBI endangers both.   
In the following, I will (1) briefly expand the basic argument in general terms and 
define the basic principles of inclusive versus exclusive growth; (2) a 
comprehensive overview of German labour market policy and labour law reforms 
since the beginning of this millennium assesses to what extent Germany is 
pursuing these principles, accompanied by selective evidence of their 
consequences for the German labour market performance; (3) a stylised and 
descriptive overview of the inclusive impact of these reforms in quantitative and 
qualitative terms follows, with an essay reflecting the concept of the inclusive 
labour contract.  
1. A right to decent work or an unconditional basic income? 
The current debate on the future of work is obsessed with two interlinked ideas: 
the digital revolution will definitely destroy 50 to 90 percent of jobs and the only 
solution for the increasing mass of jobless people is a universal basic income 
(UBI). Whereas there is no room here to show that the first – in fact very old – 
idea stands on shaky theoretical and empirical fundaments,2 the other – in fact 
equally old – idea has recently been carefully scrutinised by the OECD. The 
summary of these reflections must also suffice here before entering into the main 
argument: “But an unconditional payment to everyone at meaningful but fiscally 
realistic levels would require tax rises as well as reductions in existing benefits, 
and would often not be an effective tool for reducing income poverty. Some 
disadvantaged groups would lose out when existing benefits are replaced by a BI, 
illustrating the downsides of social protection without any form of targeting at all. 
Realistically [...] reforms towards more universal income support would need to 
                                                 
2 Among others, with many further references: Arntz et al. (2016); Eichhorst/Buhlmann (2015); 
Schmid (2018b, chapter 2).  
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be introduced in stages, requiring a parallel debate on how to finance a more equal 
sharing of the benefits of economic growth.”3  
Furthermore, there are strong ethical arguments which underline that the 
capability to earn one’s own living is a basic fundament of human dignity. Many 
constitutions and conventions refer to this ethical principle so that the hint to 
article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights from Philadelphia 
(1944/1948) should be enough: “Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of 
employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against 
unemployment.” The “ILO Declaration on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization” 
on 10 June 2008 reminds us again of this basic human right and again “affirms 
that labour is not a commodity”. This normative argument is backed by empirical 
research which consistently finds a strong connection of happiness with having  a 
job: “If society’s goal is to increase people’s feelings of well-being, economic 
growth in itself will not do the job. Full employment and a generous and 
comprehensive social safety net do increase happiness.”4 
Another line of ethical thinking goes back to Aristotle’s Nicomachean ethic, 
which states that human beings develop their capabilities and identities in taking 
personal risks and putting their “skin in the game”, i.e. being accountable and 
responsible for what they are doing. The UBI would exclude many individuals 
from this challenge and relieve employers and politicians from their responsibility 
of managing the social risks related to this challenge. Again, this argument would 
need further elaboration, which is not within the scope of this essay.5  
Only providing income security would eventually deny these intrinsic values of 
work and lead to the exclusion of an increasing number of people from labour 
market participation. We would be faced with a polarised world of work in those 
who fit to the labour market and those who mainly live on UBI and earn – if they 
wish – something in addition without being exposed to the challenges of personal 
risk-taking.   
So, what is the alternative to this dystopia? The right to decent work (RDW) 
through inclusive growth, an element – albeit not yet well developed – of the 
European Employment Strategy, might be the proper solution. Table 1 
summarises the basic elements of this strategy compared to the strategy of UBI 
through exclusive growth. 
                                                 
3 OECD (2017, from the abstract). 
4 From the abstract of Easterlin (2012/13). 
5 See the stimulating and provocative book by Taleb (2018); for risk-taking and social risk 
management see Schmid (2011, 2015a, 2018b). 
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Table 1: Principles of inclusive growth versus exclusive growth 
Right dimension Inclusive growth through Exclusive growth through 
Right to gainful work 
 
 
 
 
 
Equal treatment and 
active securities 
 
 
 
 
Labour market status 
 
 
 
 
 
Social protection 
Labour market security through 
> minimising unemployment 
> employment protection 
> working time flexibility over 
the life course, in particular 
>  internal flexibility 
> minimum wages 
> making the market fit to 
workers 
> making workers fit to the 
market 
> rights to active securities 
Labour market citizen through 
> voice and negotiated flexibility  
> early access to gainful work 
> loose but continuous ties to LM  
> cooperative learning 
environment 
> Social insurance (ex ante  
    redistribution), in particular 
> anticyclical U-benefits 
> means-tested income guarantee 
Labour market flexibility through 
> maximising employment 
> hire and fire 
> external flexibility 
 
 
> market wages 
> only making workers fit to the 
market 
> only rights to passive securities 
 
 
Civic citizen through 
> entry and exit options 
> late access to gainful work 
> strong or no ties to LM 
> competitive learning 
environment 
> Unconditional basic income   
    (UBI) 
 
 
Source: G. Schmid, own presentation.       
Since the table speaks for itself, only the main points shall be emphasised: 
- Concerning the right to gainful work, the overall objective of inclusive 
growth would be labour market security and therefore not to maximise 
employment as such but to minimise unemployment, among others through 
the protected flexibility of employment relationships, the maintenance of 
jobs through internal flexibility and public job guarantees.   
- Concerning equal treatment, a strong emphasis would be put on the 
strategy of making the market fit to workers in order to overcome the 
various restrictions of individual earning capacities over the life course, in 
particular due to unpaid social work obligations and disabilities, among 
others through the reasonable adjustment of workplaces. 
- Concerning the labour market status, inclusive growth emphasises early 
access to gainful work and voice through negotiated flexibility, above all 
through co-determination in collective agreements at the firm, regional or 
branch level. 
6 
 
- Concerning social protection, inclusive growth would accentuate social 
insurance principles with strong elements of ex ante redistribution through 
shared contributions to health, pension and unemployment insurance; this 
would, among others, allow anticyclical (‘breathing’) unemployment 
benefits or short-time work allowances to stabilise effective demand in 
cyclical troughs; UBI would tend to procyclical reactions. 
In the following, the differences between the two strategies will become clearer 
when we examine the various labour market policy and law reforms, here 
exercised for the case of Germany.  
2. German labour market policy and labour law reforms since 2000 
The recent German labour market reforms are commonly subsumed under the so-
called ‘Hartz reforms’ adopted in 2003 and 2004.6 Despite their prominence or 
even bad reputation (Hartz IV), other – and some even more important – reforms 
have to be mentioned under the inclusive perspective. To bring some order into 
the reforms, I shall use the analytical framework of transitional labour markets 
(TLM) which distinguishes five main risks of exclusion (the reverse to inclusion) 
over the life course:7 (1) School to work transitions with the risk of insufficient 
earnings capacities; (2) job-to-job transitions or transitions between standard and 
non-standard employment with the risk of precarious jobs and volatile or too low 
earnings; (3) transitions between employment and unemployment with the risk of 
downward careers or even being permanently excluded; (4) transitions between 
family work or own work and employment with the risk of restricted earnings 
capacities and career interruption; (5) transitions between employment and 
inactivity due to old age or disablement with the risk of reduced earnings or even 
total loss of any earnings capacities. 
2.1  School-to-work transitions  
With respect to school-to-work transitions, there has been no basic labour market 
reform. The main reason is that the German system of school-to-work transitions 
already widely corresponds to the principles of inclusive growth. The dual system 
in the form of apprenticeship or tertiary vocational traning combines theoretical 
with practical education as well as learning with gainful work, which means that 
young people can earn some part of their living while still being trained and 
educated for full earnings capacities. Youth unemployment is one of the lowest in 
Europe.  
                                                 
6 Due to the fact that chancellor Schröder did not follow the proposals by the Hartz Commission in 
some important respects (see Jann/Schmid 2004; Schmid 2011; Schmid 2017b), I will talk of the 
‘Schröder reforms’ in the following.  
7 For the concept and theory of TLM see Schmid/Gazier (2002), Schmid (2008, 2017, 2018b).  
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This does not mean, however, that this system is without flaws. Even many of 
those who are included suffer, for instance, through an increase in non-standard 
forms of employment8 and from low apprenticeship allowances. The new grand 
coalition (CDU/CSU and SPD) plans therefore, among others, to establish a right 
to return from part-time (e.g. combined with training) to full-time work on the one 
hand, and to introduce a minimum wage for apprentices on the other hand. These 
measures shall also increase the falling motivation to take up an apprenticeship 
and to stop the trend of young people entering university even though they lack 
the cognitive capacities, therefore facing a high risk of failure. About one-third of 
beginners drop out after two years, in particular in science subjects like 
mathematics, physics, chemistry and ICT. 
The flip side of the coin is that the successful inclusion for most young people 
into the labour market has negative repercussions for those who face 
disadvantages in terms of physical capacities (e.g. disabilities), ethnic background 
(e.g. deficits in language and communication abilities) or lack of endowments 
with basic cognitive skills (e.g. reading, mathematics). Many of these 
disadvantaged remain stuck in the complex transition system maintained by 
labour market policy measures. In 2015, 6 percent of youth finished school 
without a certificate, and 13.4 percent of youth aged 20 to 34 were without a 
vocational training certificate (in total, almost two million); for those with a 
migration background this percentage is 29.8 percent.9 So, almost two million 
young adults are excluded from sustainable labour market careers. The positive 
side is that legal reforms in recent decades have opened the access to universities 
also to youth with certified vocational training; the negative side is that those 
people without an occupational degree will never have the right to enter the 
universities.    
Many piecemeal reforms for assisting those people were implemented. 
Meanwhile, the current grand coalition government plans more, for instance, so-
called assisted apprenticeship (under the responsibility of the Labour Ministry) or 
supported apprenticeship (under the responsibility of the German PES10) – both 
intending to help on both sides of the labour market: the firms (in particular small 
enterprises) and the students, sometimes even including the parents; also large 
investments in the digital infrastructure of vocational training schools 
(Berufsschulen) have been announced.  
In terms of inclusive growth and its principle of early access to work, one basic 
reform is still outstanding: As two centrepieces of the apprenticeship system are 
eroding, i.e. the small and medium-sized enterprises as the learning location and 
highly specialised occupations as the learning goal, a strategic reorientation of 
                                                 
8 See Schmid (2015b) and Figure 1 below. 
9 Berufsbildungsbericht (2017), p. 10. 
10 PES=Public Employment Service; in Germany ‘Bundesagentur für Arbeit’. 
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dual systems of learning seems to be logical: First, early access to work has to be 
provided more and more on a school basis; and second, occupational profiles have 
to be widened to increase the adjustment capacities to the quickly changing digital 
world of work. Switzerland and Austria (probably also Denmark and the 
Netherlands) seem to be model countries in this respect. In Austria, already 26 
percent of youth aged around 16 attend full-time vocational colleges with 
integrated practical experiences in firms (Berufliche Höhere Schulen) providing 
both a licence for exercising a broadly defined occupation as well as the right to 
enter university (Matura). In Switzerland, one-third of youth attend business 
colleges or universities of applied sciences (Fachhochschulen) that also require 
practical experiences from both the teachers and the students. Both countries have 
better records than Germany in integrating youth into the labour market at their 
acquired skill levels, and both countries also do better for disadvantaged youth by 
ensuring some kind of accredited education that is marketable.11  
2.2  Job-to-job transitions 
The dynamics of job-to-job transitions in the German labour market is low and 
has even declined in recent decades compared, for instance, to the ‘flexicurity’ 
country Denmark.12 This happened despite German labour market reforms 
intending to promote flexibility and security in the employment relationships. The 
labour-turnover-rate declined after the economic expansion in 2000 and 2001 and 
during the implementation of the Schröder reforms (2002–2010) and has not 
reached the level of 7 or 8 percent per year since then.13 These reforms promoted 
three types of non-standard employment: self-employment, temporary jobs (in 
particular through temp-agency work), and marginal jobs, which will be briefly 
explained in the following.  
Before going into details of these reforms, however, the reader shall be reminded 
that one reason for the low labour turnover in Germany is internal flexibility, in 
particular through working-time flexibility either in the form of collective 
agreements or in the form of short-time working. Both measures were heavily 
used as adjustment measures in the crisis of 2008/09 and correspond, in broad 
terms at least, to the principles of inclusive growth. As they are based on 
established labour market instruments and are familiar to the scientific 
community, I abstain from further explanations and details.14     
(1) The new start-up subsidy (in Germany also called the ´Ich-AG´) has been 
supplementing the already existing bridging allowance (Überbrückungsgeld, since 
1986), which capitalised unemployment benefit entitlements in order to support 
                                                 
11 See Schmid (2015a) for further references and details. 
12 See Madsen (2006). 
13 Giannelli et al. (2013, p. 6). 
14 Among others see Schmid (2015b) for further references. 
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the unemployed in setting up their own businesses.15 Whereas the individual 
amount of bridging allowance was derived from the unemployment benefit plus a 
lump sum of €300 per month for social insurance and was paid for only six 
months, the Ich-AG subsidy was paid as a yearly decreasing lump sum for three 
years, provided the recipient’s annual income did not exceed €25,000. The risk 
associated with self-employment was cushioned by the fact that eligibility for 
unemployment benefits persisted for a period as long as four years. 
The take-up of the start-up subsidy was much higher than expected, and against 
certain initial reservations it did not replace the bridging allowance. In addition, 
from the perspective of employers, the possibility of buying the services of a self-
employed instead of hiring a dependent employed person is always an attractive 
option, since dismissal protection does not apply to this category of workers. So, 
one has to be careful since a careless promotion of self-employment might induce 
and increase unprotected fake self-employment. Furthermore, bureaucratic 
thresholds for employment creation were loosened: all business start-ups had the 
option of hiring additional employees on the basis of fixed-term contracts for up 
to four years. 
Regarding the security dimension, minimum income security was provided in the 
form of a monthly allowance of 600 Euro in the first year, 360 Euro in the second 
year, and 240 Euro in the third year. Concerning social security, it is important to 
note that in contrast to regular self-employment, social insurance was obligatory 
as long as the Ich-AG founders were in receipt of the corresponding allowance. 
Although at first sight the Ich-AG seemed to provide the founder with minimum 
income security for three years, from the second year on the allowance only 
sufficed to cover the cost of social security contributions. 
Even though evaluation research has given credit to this component of the 
Schröder reforms, the Ich-AG scheme was abolished in 2006 and merged with the 
more efficient bridging allowance to create an overall Start-up Allowance 
(Gründungszuschuss) for the unemployed. Since then, the take-up of this measure 
remained at a level of around 140,000 up to the end of 2011 when – in the vein of 
overall budget cuts – the regulation was sharply tightened: most important was the 
change from a so-called ‘obligatory measure’ (Pflichtmaßnahme) to a 
discretionary measure (Ermessensmaßnahme). In Germany an ‘obligatory’ 
measure means having the right to be promoted to self-employment if certain 
conditions are fulfilled. At the end of the day this means that the worker can go to 
court to claim his or her right.16 A ‘discretionary’ measure means that it remains 
up to the administrator to decide on the measure depending on the labour market 
                                                 
15 This measure, of course, also belongs to the section on transitions between employment and 
unemployment. 
16 The success of short-time work goes back, among others, to still being an ‘obligatory’ measure, 
i.e. a right for the workers. Even works councils are entitled to apply for short-time work at the 
PES. 
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or – more commonly –budgetary conditions. The new discretionary measure was 
further tightended by the requirement that potential beneficiaries are still entitled 
to at least 150 days of insurance-related unemployment benefits (ALG I); in other 
words, having already exhausted these days, the unemployed are no longer 
entitled; the long-term unemployed are thus excluded. 
Currently, the two basic features of the new start-up measure for the unemployed 
are: in the first six-month phase, the unemployment benefits are topped up by 300 
Euro monthly so as to ensure the social security contributions of the self-
employed; during the following second phase of nine months (after a judgement 
of whether the start-up will likely be sustainable), the beneficiary only receives 
the monthly allowance of 300 Euro. The result of this reform was a sharp drop in 
the number of participants, down to 20,000 from 30,000. The PES now plans to 
revitalise the measure by doubling the targeted budget, not least due to quite 
positive evaluations of this measure.17    
(2) Although marginal forms of employment existed even before the year 2000, 
the Schröder reforms (2003–2005) intended to ease the transition from 
unemployment or inactivity to standard employment through so-called ‘minijobs’ 
and ‘midijobs’. Other objectives were also envisaged, for instance, the curtailment 
of illegal work, especially in private households.  
Prior to the former reforms, full social insurance contributions became mandatory 
for the main form of minijobs at the current level of up to 450 Euro per month.18 
The employer, however, pays the bulk of these contributions: roughly 30 percent 
shared among the main insurance categories (15% goes towards the pension 
system, 13% to the health insurance; the rest to other items). Employees 
contribute 4 percent of their earnings, but they can opt out, and most of them do.19 
Mini-jobbers are not covered by unemployment insurance as both sides pay no 
contributions; they also do not acquire health insurance coverage; but most mini-
jobbers are covered by derived entitlements (i.e. through the parents or working 
spouses in regular employment).  
Midijobs are jobs with an income between 451 Euro and 850 Euro monthly; 
employers pay full social insurance contributions (‘only’ about 21%), whereas 
                                                 
17 Bernhard et al. (2015); Escudero (2018).  
18 300 Euros in 2003. There are also time-limited minijobs with the limit of three months per year 
and unlimited in terms of income, but they play only a minor role (their number declined from 
286,000 (2003) to 184,000 (2016).  
19 For valuable details see Düll (2018), mentioning among others: “contributions paid by 
employers to the health insurance system help to avoid a distortive effect on competition, but are 
inconsistent with the insurance principle as they are not opening up own rights of workers to 
health insurance. The same inconsistency arises when workers are opting out of pension 
contributions. The employer still has to pay contributions, but workers cannot derive own pension 
rights from these.” 
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employees’ contributions increase linearly until they reach the regular rate of 21 
percent at 850 Euro. As a result, employers might theoretically be inclined to 
transform minijobs into midijobs, but the incentive for employees is low because 
they lose net income at the threshold of 451 Euro. In total there are only about 1.3 
million midijobs.    
Back to minijobs: As a key element of the reform, the 15-hour limit on weekly 
working hours has been abolished. Hence, marginal employment can be carried 
out in addition to regular employment without becoming subject to social security 
contributions for employees. This exemption can hardly be justified with respect 
to the principles of inclusion:  
- First, it privileges insiders who already have a standard employment 
relationships and potentially excludes those without any job; 
- Second, it also makes it harder for mini-jobbers to transit into regular jobs 
because insiders who might move to better-paid jobs (or strive to move!) 
stay put as they have the chance of an additional untaxed income;  
- Third, it serves as a Trojan horse for creating jobs with low wages because 
workers who already have a regular income are more willing to take low-
paid side-jobs;  
- Fourth, people who minijob in private household services (including 
Haushaltschecks) perversely cross-subsidise well-earning households with 
low-earning persons or households;  
- Fifth, minijobs – last but not least – lead to foregone tax revenues and 
social security contributions in the range of around 4 billion Euro per year, 
which can be regarded as the costs of subsiding minijobs.  
The total number of minijobs increased from 6 million in 2003 to 7.6 million in 
2016. Whereas minijobs as the only source of income has declined slightly since 
the year 2009 (from 5.3 to 4.9 million), minijobs as a side-job more than doubled 
from 1.2 to 2.7 million. Minijobs as a percentage of total jobs, however, declined 
due to the favourable development of regular jobs, which might be interpreted as 
an indicator of the limited substitution effect (minijobs substituting regular jobs), 
and possibly even as an indicator of the complementarity of minijobs and regular 
jobs – a speculation which needs further research.  
The overall evaluation of marginal employment by employer representatives turns 
out to be positive: Minijobs are recognised as a cost-efficient and very flexible 
measure for dealing with peak periods and extended opening hours. In this 
context, competitive branches such as retail, cleaning, catering and tourism, but 
also private households, take advantage of this measure. In particular, small 
businesses appreciate the aspect of a flexible and rapid use of marginal 
employment at relatively low costs. Whereas these aspects already existed before 
12 
 
2003, the Schröder reforms abolished the limitation on weekly working hours for 
mini-jobbers and thus helped to strengthen internal numerical flexibility. The 
tripling of declared marginal employment in private households (from about 
100,000 to approximately 300,000) may serve as a further indicator of the success 
of this strategy. Private household employers, however, are subsidised twice 
through the ‘Household check’ procedure: they have to pay lower taxes and social 
security contributions, and they can deduct the expenses from their income tax 
duties.20 
From the employees’ and trade unions’ point of view, however, there is great con-
cern about minijobs offering employers the possibility to substitute regular 
employment and keep outsiders in a low-income and dead-end trap which also 
eventually leads to low social security entitlements and poverty in old age. 
Transition rates in standard employment are low, thus, minijobs cannot be 
regarded as an adequate bridge into regular employment. Midijobs, on the other 
hand, lead to a somewhat higher share of upward transitions, but too few people 
are engaged in this type of employment relationship. Furthermore, midijobs are 
also – like minijobs – for the most part carried out by women (75% vs. 60% for 
minijobs). The outcome is thus ambivalent. Marginal employment enables many 
mothers to combine paid and unpaid family work, but at the same time 
counteracts principles of inclusion (including ‘gender mainstreaming’) and 
sustainable individual security entitlements. On the positive side, however, it 
should also be mentioned that young (under 25) and elderly people (over 55) are 
overrepresented among the mini-jobbers. These ‘marginal’ age groups can be 
considered as special target groups for inclusive growth because these groups 
might be (in the case of education or in the event of early retirement) 
predominantly interested in uncomplicated additional income sources and less in 
additional employment or social protection.21  
(3) The Schröder reforms also deregulated one important part of temporary jobs, 
i.e. temp-agency work, or the triangular form of temporary employment 
relationships. Prior to this reform, the Teilzeit- und Befristungsgesetz of 2000 
(implementing the EU directive for part-time work) eased the arrangement of 
fixed-term work contracts. The intention was, again, to mobilise job-to-job 
transitions in general and the transition from unemployment to employment in 
particular. Fixed-term contracts altogether, however, have slightly decreased since 
then; they are mainly related to first jobs, in particular of young people. 
According to most recent figures, about 40 percent transit after the end of the 
contract into regular employment, 36 percent into another fixed-term contract, and 
                                                 
20 For further and more detailed information, again, visit the excellent study by Nicola Düll (2018) 
for the European Commission. 
21 61 percent of mini-jobbers with main jobs are below 25 or older than 55; among the mini-
jobbers in side-jobs this percentage is only 28.  
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25 percent become inactive or unemployed again.22 The current grand coalition 
government intends to abolish fixed-term contracts without reason, yet it remains 
open whether this gets into ‘real law’ without compromises towards the many 
employers who disagree. In the following I turn to the more dynamic (and more 
interesting) element of temporary work: the triangular labour contract.        
The Schröder reforms almost completely deregulated temp-agency work (or 
Leiharbeit, Arbeitnehmerüberlassung) only with the remaining provision that the 
employment relationships shall be controlled by collective agreements. Under this 
provision, collective agreements even allowed us to deviate from the principle of 
equal treatment – a form of regulation which bluntly violates the inclusion 
principles. Furthermore, the government at that time (under chancellor Schröder) 
did not expect the competition between trade union representatives in the temp-
agency sector would develop into a harsh power battle between unions under the 
umbrella of the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) and unions under the 
umbrella of Christliche Gewerkschaften Zeitarbeit und PersonalServiceAgenturen 
(CGZP). For instance, a collective agreement of the so-called Christian 
(sic!)Trade Union allowed Schlecker (a former German employer in retailing 
which has since gone bankrupt) to close many shops and rehire the workers 
through a dubious temp-agency firm which paid its workers 30 percent lower 
wages than before and provided much less generous fringe benefits like holidays 
and Christmas payments. This led to a charge against CGZP by ver.di (a large 
DGB trade union) which eventually succeeded because the CGZP did not fulfill 
the clause on representing the majority of the corresponding retail workers. In the 
meantime, the so-called Tarifautonomiestärkungsgesetz of July 2014 established a 
mandatory minimum wage (8.50 Euro in 2015, 8.84 Euro since January 2017) 
which solved many problems related to temp-agency work.23  
Temp-agency work (officially Leiharbeit) has increased rapidly from a level of 
about 200,000 to over one million since 2015, however, with a lower speed than 
before. Although its share of employment reaches only 2.8 percent, 14 percent of 
transitions into unemployment and 19 percent of transitions from unemployment 
into employment come from temp-agency workers. 
Nowadays, Leiharbeit is commonly accepted as a legitimised instrument of  
flexibility for employers and the overall economy. The social and even the 
economic risks connected with this employment relationship, however, are still 
not managed satisfactorily. For employees, the risk of unemployment is almost 
five times higher than for regular employees (3.06 vs. 0.63), but only a minority 
of temp-agency workers are covered by UI; most of them receive only ALG II 
                                                 
22 Figures reported by newspapers referring to IAB. 
23 For a summary of respective regulations and first insights from evaluation studies about the 
impacts see Bruttel et al. (2017). 
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(Hartz IV).24 Furthermore, many temp-agency workers are low-wage earners; 5 
percent of temp-agency workers (with 75% working full-time!) receive additional 
transfers of Hartz IV, compared to 2 percent of ‘regular’ workers. Average wages 
of temp-agency workers are far below those of regular workers. Approximately 50 
percent of temp-agency workers are contracted out for less than three months. The 
envisaged stepping stone function – transitions from temp-agency work to regular 
work – is rather modest (at most for about 20 percent); for unemployed, however, 
these stepping stones are at least marginally better than for those who do not use 
this opportunity.25 
From an inclusive point of view, however, three features of current temp-agency 
work in Germany are still quite problematic:  
- First, even the recent reform of the Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsgesetz 
(21.02.2017) did not fully establish the equal treatment principle. Equal 
pay only has to be realised after nine months of continuous employment 
(in 2017, only 30 percent of temp-agency workers reached this level), and 
collective agreements can even legitimize unequal pay for up to 15 
months. 
-  Second, although the new regulation now stipulates the maximal duration 
of ‘Entleihung’ at 18 months (the Schröder regulation set no time limit at 
all), practically it is still possible to recruit the same temp-agency workers 
permanently: a break of three months after 18 months (probably bridged 
by unemployment benefits) is enough to rehire the same worker. Thus, 
that principle of temp-agency – that it should only temporarily bridge the 
lack of a workforce (typically seasonal or replacing workers on parental 
leave) – is bluntly violated. Temp-agency work still opens the door for 
lower rather than regular wages and de facto discrimination against 
workers. 
- The negative indirect economic repercussions of this regulation should not 
be underestimated, as with this instrument employers have a convenient 
instrument of flexibility. They can relax and neglect long-term investments 
in a larger part their staff, thus deepening the cleavage between insiders 
and outsiders. Furthermore, the expected overall impact on productivity, 
innovation and competitiveness is more than doubtful: both 
microeconomic and macroeconomic research hints more towards a 
negative impact.26 
                                                 
24 Bundesagentur (2018, 14). 
25 Lehmer/Ziegler (2010). 
26 See Schmid (2018b), including more references. 
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2.3 Transitions between employment and unemployment 
The key part of the Schröder reforms were directed towards speeding the 
transition from unemployment to employment in general and preventing long-
term unemployment in particular through the ‘modernisation of labour market 
services’.27 Apart from the already mentioned ‘Ich-AGs’ (transitions from 
unemployment to self-employment) and the minijobs (thought of as stepping 
stones to regular jobs), these reforms consisted of five main elements (‘Module’): 
(1) The first part of the administrative reforms can be subsumed under the strategy 
to activate the unemployed through ‘supporting and demanding’ (‘Fördern und 
Fordern’) measures. The supporting measures were mainly an improvement of 
placement services, especially through a larger and better-trained staff responsible 
for placement services and employment promotion. The demanding measures 
mainly consisted of tightening the rules on accepting a ‘suitable’ job and in 
reducing unemployment benefits for older people. In this context, it should be 
noted that prior to the Schröder reforms, older employees were eligible for wage-
related benefits for up to 32 months. As a consequence of this particular legal 
condition, employers frequently made use of the ‘golden handshake’option, thus 
shifting their older employees into early retirement. Such arrangements were 
facilitated by the pension system, which allowed retirement at the age of 60 
without a corresponding actuarial reduction of pension benefits. Both rules were 
adjusted: the duration of unemployment benefits was cut to 12 months, or to 18 
months for people aged over 55 (now, after a minor reform, up to 24 months). 
Furthermore, in cases of early retirement, the pension regulations now foresee an 
actuarial reduction of benefits. It is – at least partly – due to these new regulations 
that in the course of the economic upswing the employment rates of elderly 
employees have risen, while their unemployment rates have decreased 
significantly. 
(2) Since the reforms, profiling is used to divide jobseekers into client groups 
(job-ready, counselling, and intensive-service clients) according to their distance 
from the labour market. The classification of clients serves as a basis for 
individual action plans and for allocating labour market services. The clients’ 
streamlining is organised according to strict schedules in order to ensure 
individualised counselling and to avoid waiting queues. These measures have 
certainly improved the lot of the first two groups. The ‘intensive-service clients’, 
however, are even more neglected than before. 
(3) Services to employers are improved through time-budget allocation for such 
services (at least 20 percent of the agencies’ time) and ‘premium’ clients, faster 
reaction times, prior contacts to both employers and jobseekers, referral of a 
                                                 
27 See again the report of the Hartz-Commission (consisting – apart from its head Peter Hartz – of 
14 people) which, unfortunately, only few people have read (if any, except the members of the 
commission); see Hartz (2002). 
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limited number of qualified contacts, follow-up contacts, an improved vacancy 
database and monitoring the matching process. The central goal lies in obtaining 
employers’ attention and willingness to cooperate and, thus, increasing the share 
of notified vacancies. These measures have also considerably improved matching 
efficiency.28 
(4) The reform also puts an emphasis on privatisation in the form of the outside 
provision of placement services. Most of the corresponding instruments, however, 
especially the Personnel Service Agencies (PSA), have not been successful.29 
PSAs are temporary work agencies for the unemployed that are established on a 
contract basis with a local service provider, which is in many cases part of the 
temporary work industry. This instrument, however, has failed to live up to the 
Hartz Commission’s great expectations, mainly because the amalgamation of 
placement and temporary work functions have sent ambivalent signals to both the 
PES agencies and their clients. After a process of learning and calibration, the 
instrument of issuing placement vouchers to persons who had been unemployed 
for more than six weeks turned out to be only partially successful. Private 
agencies are paid a maximum of 2,000 Euro for placing an unemployed person in 
an employment of at least 15 hours per week: 1,000 Euro after an employment 
duration of at least six weeks and an additional 1,000 Euro after a duration of at 
least six months. 
(5) The main, albeit ambivalent, impact was due to the merging of unemployment 
assistance and social assistance. Prior to the reform, the PES administered two 
types of benefits, which de facto defined its clientele for active measures: 
unemployment benefits (Arbeitslosengeld), which provided payments at a level of 
67 percent (unemployed with children) or 60 percent (unemployed without 
children) of previous net wages for 12 months (or up to 32 months for older 
employees), and unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe) after eligibility for 
regular unemployment benefits had expired. Unlike unemployment benefits, 
unemployment assistance was means-tested, amounted to 53 to 57 percent of 
previous net wages, and was paid for an unlimited period as long as PES could not 
provide a ‘suitable’ job. A third type of benefit was the so-called social assistance 
(Sozialhilfe), in other words, means-tested benefits at the subsistence level. Social 
assistance for unemployed people who were not eligible for PES benefits was 
funded and administered by the local authorities, the counties and the larger 
municipalities. On average, about 80 percent of total social assistance expenditure 
was funded by the local authorities, while the remaining 20 percent was funded by 
the German federal states (Länder).  
                                                 
28 One of these studies came to the conclusion that the organisational reforms explain about 20 
percent of the decrease in unemployment, whereas the reform of unemployment benefits explains 
only about 5 percent, cf. Launova/Wälde (2016). 
29 See Hess et al. (2006). 
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This complex system of benefit provision had important consequences for the 
provision of job-brokering and other active measures for the unemployed in 
Germany: 
- First, more and more unemployed were no longer eligible for regular 
unemployment benefits, rather only for means-tested unemployment 
assistance or social assistance.  
- Second, the PES focused its active programmes de facto on its own core 
clientele of unemployment benefit recipients, who were being funded 
through the PES budget; other unemployed were either eligible for 
unemployment assistance administered by PES but were financed by the 
national government or had to apply to the local authorities for social 
assistance; recipients of social assistance administered by the local 
authorities and other unemployed persons not eligible for PES benefits 
were generally excluded from active PES programmes.  
- Third, as a response to the unemployed who depended on social assistance, 
local labour market programmes for the long-term unemployed were 
mushrooming under the auspices of the local authorities.  
- Fourth, many of these local programmes were explicitly aimed at shifting 
the unemployed back under the responsibility of the PES; this was 
possible by creating intermediary jobs lasting up to 12 months, thereby 
entitling the participants to regain eligibility for unemployment benefits 
and thereafter unlimited unemployment assistance. In the end, the losers of 
this shifting of responsibilities (labelled by some experts as ‘organised 
irresponsibility’) were the long-term unemployed, especially low-skilled 
and older people, which was reflected in over-proportional unemployment 
rates in these target groups. 
Under these conditions, the unlimited allowance of means-tested, yet wage-
related, unemployment assistance turned out to have negative effects on work 
incentives, especially for those unemployed with prior earnings that had been 
relatively high. As this regulation also encouraged the use of ‘golden handshakes’, 
the unemployment insurance system prior to the Schröder reforms practically 
excluded many elderly people from participating in the labour market in exchange 
for generous early retirement schemes. Viewed from the regulatory idea of an 
inclusive labour contract – see last section – one can also put this in other terms: 
Both employers and (elderly) employees were released from the obligation of 
adjustment to structural change on the cost of the shrinking active members of the 
labour market who – at the end of the day – had to finance such an expensive 
early retirement scheme.    
The Schröder reforms overhauled this highly flawed incentive system by 
replacing unemployment assistance with a so-called ‘basic (income) security’ 
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(Grundsicherung, or Arbeitslosengeld II). ALG II, better known as Hartz IV, is a 
means-tested and flat-rate allowance for all jobseekers who are not entitled to 
unemployment benefits, no matter whether they are clients of the local authorities 
(formerly social assistance recipients) or clients of the PES (formerly 
unemployment benefit recipients). The reform established thereby two completely 
separate regulatory systems (‘Rechtskreise’) for jobseekers: with the 
Sozialgesetzbuch III (SGB III) setting the rules for ALG I recipients and the 
Sozialgesetzbuch II (SGB II) setting the rules for Hartz IV recipients. Most 
importantly, from an inclusive growth perspective, is the fact that the definition of 
an employable jobseekers was now extended. All those who are able to work at 
least three hours per day are now employable and fall under the ‘regulatory circle’ 
of SGB II.  
The impact of this part of Schröders reform – often neglected by critical 
opponents– was an improvement of the inclusion in the labour market in two 
respects:  
- First, more jobseekers (unemployed) are now covered by the broader 
unemployment insurance (ALG I and ALG II) system: the coverage 
increased from 79 percent (2003) to 92 percent (2015), although the share 
of ALG I recipients declined from 38 to 26 percent, whereas the share of 
AGL II recipients increased from 41 to 66 percent.30 
- Second, all ALG II recipients are now included in the system of ‘active 
labour market policy’, although to some extent under less favourable 
conditions than ALG I recipients (e.g. excluded from supported start-up 
measures).     
The corresponding administrative reform, however, was not fully successful in 
establishing corresponding ‘job centres’ or one-stop shops for all of the clients 
under the clear responsibility of the PES, as the Hartz Commission had 
recommended. Due to the complex interrelationships under German federalism 
and a political stalemate between the leading parties, a compromise emerged 
which again established fragmented responsibilities between the PES and the local 
authorities with respect to the recipients of ‘basic security’.31  
The current level of social protection for jobseekers outside the unemployment 
insurance system in the narrower sense (ALG I) is the following (January 2018): 
For a needy single unemployed person, Hartz IV pays an allowance of 416 Euro 
per month; married adults receive 90 percent (374 Euro); also – in the case of 
need – costs for accommodation are paid. In the case of an unemployed family 
                                                 
30 These figures are calculated from Table IV. D.1, Bundesagentur für Arbeit: Arbeitsmarkt 2015, 
p. 112. 
31 The majority of jobcentres at the regional level are cooperative ‘Arbeitsgemeinschaften’ 
between PES and the municipalities; a smaller part is run only by municipalities.  
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with two children (four and 12 years old), the family may receive altogether: 
2x374 Euro + 240 Euro (child four years old) + 296 Euro (child 12 years old) + 
644 Euro (accommodation and heating) = 1,928 Euro minus 388 Euro 
‘Kindergeld’, which makes a total of 1,540 Euro.32 This sum corresponds roughly 
to the gross wage of one full-time wage earner working at the minimum wage 
(8.84 Euro). Under certain circumstances, additional allowances can increase the 
amount of the transfer income. The transfer recipients can also earn some 
additional income up to a certain amount. As a result, economic incentives to 
work turn out to be rather mean for low-income earners, in some cases even 
negative. Furthermore, all ‘basic security’ recipients are entitled to active labour 
market policy – almost to the same extent as recipients of regular unemployment 
benefits.  
Taken all together, this element of the Hartz reforms created losers as well as 
winners. The losers are mainly relatively well-paid former unemployment 
assistance recipients; the winners are former social assistance beneficiaries who 
are now also eligible for active labour market policy measures. 
This reform did not solve, and even aggravated, at least five problems: 
- First, long-term unemployed who are disadvantaged either by age, low 
skills or limited work capacities, still have few chances to transit to a 
sustainable job with a decent income. Futhermore, the PES’ or the job 
centres’ staff administering activation programmes are often not qualified 
enough or are overloaded; many having only fixed-term contracts. Thus, 
long-term unemployment is still at a level of 850,000 (34 percent of the 
total of 2.5 million), and a growing part of these people are unemployed 
for longer than four years.33   
- Second, Germany is still suffering from a depressed employment rate of 
low-skilled people, which is reflected on the other side of the coin by high 
informal or even illegal (‘black’) work. 
                                                 
32 http://www.bmas.de/DE/Themen/Arbeitsmarkt/Grundsicherung/Leistungen-zur-Sicherung-des-
Lebensunterhalts/2-teaser-artikelseite-arbeitslosengeld-2-sozialgeld.html; download 07.05.2018. A 
single person without child would receive 737 Euro (416+321 accomodation); a single person with 
a child up to four years old would receive 922 Euro (416+150 [’Mehrbedarf’]+240 [child]+464 
[accomodation]-194 [Kindergeld]-154 [Unterhaltsgeld]). 
33 The current plan of the government to provide up to 150,000 jobs in the ‘social labour market’ 
for the long-term unemployed during the next four (sic!) years might simply not be successful 
because the PES does not have enough personal capacities to implement this programme. In a joint 
venture, trade unions’ and employers’ representatives of PES deplored this paradox situation in a 
public letter; ‘paradox’ since in the last years the PES’ budget already made surpluses just for this 
reason, welcomed of course by the then finance minister Schäuble who was obsessed with the idea 
of a zero budget.  Nevertheless, administrative costs of PES are reported to be 4.43 billion Euro, 
i.e. 21 percent of 21 billion expenditure for ALG II, not a sign of high efficiency..  
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- Third, there remains the problem of the working poor, whose earnings 
(often despite full-time work) fall below the minimum income and who 
therefore receive ‘basic security’ to top up their incomes (currently about 
800,000). 
- Fourth, the procedures of calclulating the ‘Grundsicherung’ became 
extremely bureaucratic leading to many individual suits against the false or 
delayed decisions of the Hartz IV administration. The German law is 
obsessesed with the ideal of individual case justice 
(Einzelfallgerechtigkeit), leading to bizarre excesses of bureaucracy.34  
- Fifth, sanctions mechanisms against people not accepting job offers (or 
misbehaving in other ways) were too harsh, especially against young 
people under 25. Furthermore, the ‘basic allowance’ amount did not 
follow the real average wage income. 
 
Altogether, this part of the Schröder reforms gained such a bad reputation that 
‘Hartz IV’ – despite some crucial positive elements – became the stereotype for a 
‘neoliberal’ policy that eventually broke the neck of the Social Democratic Party. 
Currently (May 2018) there is a hot political debate that will probably lead to a 
basic reform of the ‘Grundsicherung’.  
2.4 Transitions between employment and unpaid (family) work  
Under the inclusive growth perspective, issues of equal opportunity for women 
and work-life-balance become crucial. The already mentioned Teilzeit- und 
Befristungsgesetz of 2000 made it easier to arrange part-time contracts and to 
ensure principles of inclusion such as equal treatment in terms of wages, 
dismissals and social protection. As in many other EU member states, part-time 
jobs increased steadily, in particular for women, and this employment dynamic is 
– in contrast to other forms of non-standard work – unbroken.35 One of the hottest 
issues in the current political debate is the intention of the new government 
(enforced by the social democratic party) to establish an effective right to 
intermediate part-time, which means the right to take part-time work and return 
into full-time under equal conditions.  
Even for men it has become slightly more attractive to work part-time, especially 
following the reform of parental leave in 2007. The new parental leave allowance 
(‘Elterngeld’) is inclusive in as far as it also covers the income risk due to 
transiting into full ‘inactivity’ or to intermediate part-time work due to parental 
                                                 
34 Just to mention one example: A married couple (‘Bedarfsgemeinschaft’) with one child gets 
divorced; she may receive Hartz IV, he is a full wage earner. When the child visits the father 
during the weekend and has breakfast and dinner with him, these days have to be deducted from 
the calculation of the child allowance for the mother. The Hartz Commission tried to avoid such 
awful little things through the provision of generous lump sums.    
35 See also Figure 3 below. 
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care work. In other words, income loss due to full-time or part-time leave is now 
insured, like in the case of ‘full-time’ unemployment, by 67 percent of the former 
net wage income. The condition is to some extent a kind of gender risk-sharing. 
Of the 14 months in which Elterngeld is paid, at least two months have to be 
taken up by men. Such a leave allowance might also be considered as an element 
of employment insurance although it is formally not included in UI and is not 
financed by individual or employer’s contributions. Moreover, the entitlements 
are portable from one employer to another and to any other location in the 
country.36   
In 2015, this law was extended by another innovative element. The ‘Elterngeld 
Plus‘ now supports all those parents who want to work even during the time of 
receiving this allowance. In this way, mothers and fathers have the possibility to 
extend the (pro rate) supported time of parental leave up to two years: One month 
Elterngeld doubles to two months Elterngeld Plus: If both parents share child care 
equally by working 25 to 30 hours per week, they receive four additional months, 
called Partnerschaftsbonus. The take-up of the new scheme is very encouraging. 
The new government allocated 6.4 billion Euro to this item in 2018. 
2.5 Transitions between employment and (early) retirement 
Transitions to early retirement only due to age reasons have been starkly reduced 
since the labour market reforms under Schröder. In the 1990s it was not unusual, 
in particular for men, to retire early aged 55 or 58 supported by generous transfers 
or golden handshakes (see above). Later, under the first grand coalition, the 
retirement age was even lifted from 65 to 67, stepwise to be implemented from 
cohort to cohort until 2029. The last grand coalition, however, eased again the 
possibility to retire at 63 for people who had completed 45 years of continuous 
employment covered by socal security.    
Nevertheless, this little reform against the overall spirit of increasing working life 
time produced only a small dip in the rising trend of the average retirement age, 
which increased from about 62 (2000) to 64 (2016).37 The inclusive impact into 
the labour market is even strongly reflected in the labour force participation of 
people aged 56 to 65, which rocketed from 48.1 (2006) to 68.6 percent in 2016, 
more than 20 percentage points within 10 years!38   
Transitions to early retirement due to health reasons (Erwerbsminderung), 
however, still make up 18 percent of all retirement flows (20 percent in 2000), 
                                                 
36 For details and evaluation see Bergemann/Riphahn (2015). 
37 For women it is even slightly higher than for men. 
38 See also Figure 4 below for the age group 58 to 67. 
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with an average retirement age of 52 for men and 51 for women.39 The 
employment rate for people with restricted work capacity is only 35 percent (UK 
36%); the unemployment rate in Germany is one of the highest and is above the 
EU28 average of 18 percent.40 The number of severely disabled people who are 
unemployed rose by 1.2 percent from 2009 to 2016, although total unemployment 
declined by 21.2 percent; during the same time period, the number of participants 
in labour market policy measures fell by 35.4 percent!41   
From the inclusive growth perspective, the labour market (policy and law) reform 
for the integration of severly disabled people in 2001 was in theory quite modern 
in anticipating some key principles of the UN Convention of 2008. The law 
stipulated the right of disabled people against their employer to 
- a job that enables them to utilise and to develop further their abilities and 
knowledge 
- privileged access to firm-specific training 
- facilitation of their participation in external training 
- a work environment that conforms to their disability, and 
- a workplace that is equipped with the required technical facilities.42 
This reform, which can be labelled a ‘negotiated capacity building through 
accommodation’, corresponds to the general TLM strategy of extending work 
opportunities through ‘making the market fit to workers’ with the aim of greater 
social inclusion. This means enriching the standard employment contract by 
imposing on employers duties of reasonable adjustment in favour of workers, 
especially for those with reduced work capacity. In other words – and recently 
also formulated by Simon Deakin in a joint publication with Alain Supiot – rather 
than requiring the individual to be ‘adaptable’ to changing market conditions, the 
employment contract requires that employment practices be adapted to the 
circumstances of the individual.43 
It is evident that these kinds of adjustment duties require support through 
procedural rules, for instance, negotiation through collective agreements, social 
pacts or covenants between firms and other key actors in the local or regional 
labour market. At the firm level, i.e. the case of workplace accommodation for  
severely disabled people, German law envisages clear procedures to be taken in 
order to ensure the maintenance of the employment relationship through, for 
                                                 
39 The dominant reason being 42.8 percent for psychic (and not, as expected, for physic) reasons, 
with an upward trend of this share! 
40 Figures from Berger (2015). 
41 Figures from DGB (2016); according to these figures, the activation ration for the disabled is 
only 18% compared to 25% of all unemployed . 
42 SGB (Sozialgesetzbuch) IX, §81 (4). 
43 Deakin (2009, p. 28), provides good practices mainly related to disability policy in Europe, an 
emphasis that correctly reflects the salience of this problem as also noted by Amartya Sen (2009). 
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example, the involvement of rehabilitation experts, ‘integration management’ and 
‘integration agreements’ (§§ 83, 84 SGB IX).44  
Yet, as the figures above suggest, the reality in implementing such rules is far 
from the ideal. Complementary regulations are necessary which – to some extent 
– have been considered in a new and complementary law. Therefore, the 
Bundesteilhabegesetz of 2016 stipulated or induced four important amendments: 
- First, the priority of rehabilitation before pension, in other words, the 
priority of the right to work against the right to income replacement. 
- Second, if a new job or job maintenance is ensured through workplace 
adjustment and/or personal assistance then the own work income (wages) 
is to a large extent not counted against the social transfer entitlements for 
disability – in other words: work pays.  
- Third, works councils are now – through an amendment of the 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz (§ 92, 3 (2)) – explicitly mandated to monitor 
the work priority for the disabled or people with restricted work capacities 
and to take initiatives for necessary adjustments measures. 
- Fourth, jobcentres and pension agencies are – since the start of 2018 up to 
2022 – entitled to apply for rehabilitation pilot projects for which a special 
budget position has been allocated (one billion Euro). 
 3. Lessons to be learned from the perspective of inclusion 
Having reviewed some theoretical foundations as well as the current policy 
reforms, the remainder of this paper will seek to identify a set of lessons to be 
derived from the German experience and under the perspective of inclusive 
growth. What are the major insights yielded by our analysis? Which parts of the 
reform can be viewed as successful? What went wrong and why? What are the 
strategic conclusions for re-establishing the right to work for all who want to gain 
self-sufficiency and individual autonomy (sovereignty) as far as possible? I start 
with a brief summary of the main empirical results in a stylised form (3.1), 
followed by a sketch of the inclusive labour contract as a regulatory idea for 
inclusive growth in the future digital world of work (3.2). 
                                                 
44 A pathbreaking pilot project for ‘Betriebliches Eingliederungmanagement‘ is described in 
Giesert et al. (2013) which tried to institutionalise a kind of ‘employability coaching’. 
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3.1 Stylised outcomes of German labour market reforms  
Inclusive growth has at least two dimensions: quantitative and qualitative. In 
quantitative terms, the main indicators of inclusive growth are employment and 
unemployment of the working-age population in general, and for vulnerable 
groups in particular (youth, elderly, women, disabled). In qualitative terms, the 
main indicators are working conditions, the employment relationship reflecting 
the degree of labour market security and social protection through work, and risk 
of income poverty. As I have already hinted to some detailed outcomes in 
describing and explaining the German labour market reforms, I confine myself in 
the following to rather stylised outcomes and in the order of the TLM framework. 
(1) On a highly aggregated level, the German youth labour market is quite 
inclusive, and the degree of inclusion has even slightly improved (see black line in 
Figure 1): The overall participation rate for youth and young adults (15–27) 
increased from a level of 60 percent in 1998 to 61.4 percent; the corresponding 
figures for EU28 – displayed as a shadow line – are 55.8 percent for both years. 
Figure 1:  Labour market participation of youth and young adults in age 15–27 
in Germany as percent of population aged 15–27 (1998–
2016)(shadow lines for EU28) 
 
The aggregate inclusion is composed, however, by 31.2 percent employment in 
risky non-standard forms (see green line: part-time, temporary or self-
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employment),45 which increased and substituted to some extent standard 
employment relationships (see blue line: dependent and open-ended full-time 
wage work), which is now at the level of 26.5 percent, yet back on a slightly 
improving trend. On the other hand, the level of youth unemployment fell 
substantially to 3.8 percent, compared to still 8.3 percent for EU28. Note that all 
figures refer to the corresponding working age group; (youth) unemployment is 
usually measured as a percent of the corresponding ‘active’ workforce (employed 
plus unemployed youth) resulting in larger figures; all coloured lines, therefore, 
add up to the black line. 
 (2) The level of inclusion measured by labour market participation of the core 
working age group (28 to 57) also improved at the aggregate level (Figure 2): 
Overall, labour force participation increased from 81 percent (1998) to 86.9 
percent (2016) and is substantially higher than for EU28 (see shadow line: 76.8 
percent and 83.5 percent).  
Figure 2: Labour market participation of the LM core group in age 28 to 57 in 
Germany as percent of population aged 28 to 57 (1998–
2016)(shadow lines for EU28) 
 
                                                 
45 Controlled for overlapping; see for definitions and details (which also holds for the following 
figures) Schmid (2018b) and Schmid/Wagner (2018). 
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Only a minor part of this growth, however, was due to there being more people in 
regular jobs at a level corresponding to the EU28 average; most of this growth is 
related to the increase of non-standard labour force participation (green line) from 
24.2 to 33.4 percent. The comparative lines show that the rising gap between 
Germany and EU28 started with the Schröder reforms. On the other hand, 
unemployment (red line) started to go down at about the same time by 5.1 
percentage points from 8.2 to 3.1 percent whereas unemployment for this age 
group at the EU28 level remained almost constant (6.4 vs. 6.1 percent).  
(3) Regarding the transition between employment and unemployment or vice 
versa, transition probabilities would be the proper information to reflect the 
changing dynamics induced through labour market policy or labour law reforms. 
As stylised outcome, however, one single and crude indicator should suffice for 
this aim: the dynamic and changing relationship between short-term and long-
term unemployment. As long-term unemployment is the real evil to fight because 
being out of work for a long time excludes individuals from participation not only 
in gainful employment (with increasing poverty risks) but also (indirectly) from 
participation in social and political realms, keeping long-term unemployment as 
low as possible is of utmost importance for social inclusion.  
Figure 3: Total unemployment rate, broken down in its components of short-
term and long-term unemployment, as a percentage of the working 
age population in age 15 to 67 in Germany (2002–2017)(shadow 
lines for EU28) 
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Figure 3 shows therefore the development of total unemployment as a percentage 
of the population in working age 15 to 67 in Germany from 2002 to 2017 (with 
EU28 as shadow lines), broken down into two components: the short-term 
unemployment rate (unemployed with a duration up to one year), and the long-
term unemployment rate (unemployed with a duration longer than one year).46  
The curves of Figure 3 reveal some interesting facts: First of all, compared to the 
total EU28 community, German unemployment jumped during the first years of 
the Schröder reforms to a historical hight: 4.5 million unemployed on average in 
year 2005. Or to put it more drastically: Of the 21 million unemployed in Europe, 
almost every fourth or fifth was German; Germany was the “sick man of Europe.” 
Then, however, the reforms quickly became effective and the level of total 
unemployment decreased more rapidly than in EU28. Second, in sharp contrast to 
EU28, total unemployment remained almost constant during the recession in 
2008/09, in particular due to internal flexibility measures. Third, the resilience of 
the ’German model’ proved its strength during the aftermath of the recession: total 
unemployment went further down whereas most of the other EU memberstates 
experienced a further in increase up to a level of 26.3 million in 2013. Since then, 
fourth, the German unemployment dynamics ran parallel to EU28. 
The relationship between short-term and long-term unemployment also improved 
considerably. In EU28 as an aggregate, the share of long-term unemployment 
never exceeded short-term unemployment; both curves came near together only in 
2013/14. As the Schröder reforms were initiated, however, long-term 
unemployment started to exceed short-term unemployment: In 2006/07, the 
number of long-term unemploymed was over half a million higher than the 
number of short-term unemployed. The situation, however, changed during and 
after the recession when long-term unemployment declined faster than short-term 
unemployment. Yet, as we already noted in the respective policy analysis above, 
the long-term unemployment curve is still near the short-term unemployment line, 
and for at least around 700.000 long-term unemployed, the risk of social exclusion 
is still real and high. The hard-core, i.e. those who are longer than four years 
unemployed, even increased or remained almost constant during the last years.    
(4) Female labour force participation reflects to a large extent the transition 
dynamics between gainful and unpaid family work. Figure 4 shows (indirectly) 
that the inclusive impact of the last labour market reforms in Germany was much 
stronger for women than for men; it was also higher compared to EU28. 
                                                 
46 Note again the difference in the definition compared tot he usual denominator of published unemployment 
rates that have the active labour force (employed plus unemployed) as denominator. Data in Figure 3 are 
compiled from various Employment and Social Development Reports of the European Commission and own 
calculations. Due to standardisation, they are not strictly comparable to the data used in the other figures or 
mentioned in the text. 
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First, unemployment improved and is below the level of men (2.6 percent women 
vs. 3.4 percent men). Female labour force participation rocketed within the 18-
year period from 56.9 to 68.2 percent, whereas the labour force participation rate 
of men (not shown here) only slightly improved from 73.2 to 77.1 percent; the 
gender gap thereby diminished from 21.3 to 8.9 percentage points! The 
corresponding gender gap at the EU28 level also improved but is still at 11.5 
percent.  
Most of this inclusion or gender gap reduction, however, was obtained through 
non-standard work, in particular part-time work (green line) which is now far 
beyond the level of EU28 (38.7 versus 26.9 percent). With respect to regular 
work, German women are now even below the EU28 level (26.9 percent versus 
29.5 percent); correspondingly, the German gender gap between men and women 
related to standard employment only slightly improved from 23.9 to 23.5 
percentage points!!  
Figure 4: Labour market participation of women in Germany as percent of 
female population aged 15 to 67 (1998–2016)(shadow lines for 
EU28) 
 
(5) Most impressive was the inclusion impact for mature aged people in the age 
group 58 to 67. Figure 5 tells the story. Labour force participation of this age 
group jumped from 13.3 percent to 38.8 percent, accompanied by a slight increase 
in unemployment, which reflects the stronger labour market attachment of this 
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group compared to the late 1990s. This dynamic was less impressive at the EU28 
level where labour force participation of mature aged people ‘only’ increased 
from 16 percent to 28.2 percent (shadow line).  
It is remarkable that this positive dynamic was accompanied by a parallel increase 
of both standard and non-standard employment. Finally, it is also worthwile 
mentioning that the inclusion of mature aged people speeded up after the 
economic recession in 2008/09. Parallel improvement also happened for the EU28 
average, however, not with such a stark speeding up after the recession. The non-
standard participation rate for Germany in this age group is now at 20.3 percent 
(EU28: 14.3%), and the standard employment rate at the level of 17 percent 
(EU28: 12.3%). 
Figure 5: Labour market participation of elderly people in age 58 to 67 in 
Germany as percent of population aged 58 to 67 (1998–
2016)(shadow lines for EU28) 
 
To sum up: Germany’s quantitative inclusive growth in terms of labour force 
participation was stronger than at the overall EU28 level. What about the 
performance in qualitative terms? As Germany’s inclusive growth was promoted 
to a large extent by non-standard employment, it seems plausible that the outlook 
at the qualitative level will turn out to be less favourable. The following Table 2 
confirms this expectation.  
30 
 
Table 2: Indicators of qualitative inclusion in Europe, 2005, 2010, 2015  
Indicator  Country  2005 2010 2015 Difference (2015–2005)   
 
Income Poverty 
(percent of 
population 
<60% median)*  
 
EU19 
EU28 
Germany 
Greece  
 
15.5 
16.4 
12.2 
19.6 
 
16.3 
16.5 
15.6 
20.1 
 
17.2 
17.3 
16.7 
21.4 
      
     1.7  
     0.9  
     4.5  
     2.8  
 
Material Poverty 
(percent of population with 
severe material 
deprivation)*  
 
EU19 
EU28 
Germany 
Greece  
   
  6.3 
10.7 
  4.6 
12.8 
 
6.1 
8.4 
4.5 
   11.6 
   
  6.9 
  8.1 
  4.4 
22.2 
      
     0.6  
  -  2.6 
  -  0.2 
     9.6  
 
Earnings Capacity Poverty 
(as percent of population in 
households with low 
employment intensity)* 
 
EU19 
EU28 
Germany 
Greece  
   
  9.8 
10.3 
12.0 
 7.6 
 
10.4 
10.,3 
11.,2 
 7.6 
  
11.2 
10.6 
  9.8 
16.8 
      
     1.4 
     0.3 
 - 2.2 
     9.2 
 
Income Inequality 
(proportion S80/S20)  
 
EU19 
EU28 
Germany 
Greece  
   
  4.7 
  5.0 
  3.8 
  5.8 
 
4.9 
4.9 
4.5 
5.6 
   
  5.2 
  5.2 
  4.8 
  6.5 
      
     0.,5   
     0.2 
     1.0 
     0.7  
Source: European Commission, Employment and Social Developments 2017; Tables in 
Apppendix, difference in percentage points. 
*) These are the three dimensions chosen by the European Commission as a weighted benchmark 
for being at risk of poverty or exclusion (AROPE); for definitions see: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/People_at_risk_of_poverty_or_social_exclusion (download: 02.04.2018). 
Apart from Greece, which was chosen as a contrasting ‘poor’ country, ‘rich’ 
Germany performs worse than the EU28 or EU19 (Eurozone) at three points 
among the selected four indicators of qualitative inclusion: 
- The risk of income poverty increased faster than in the EU28 or EU19 by 
4.5 percentage points from 2005 to 2015, albeit from a level below the EU 
average, even more so than in Greece. 
-  Material deprivation stagnated more or less (-0.2), albeit at a low level 
(‘rich’ country), whereas it declined substantially in EU28; albeit not in 
Greece where it extended – not surprisingly – to a broader popluation from 
12.8 to 22.2 percent. 
- The increase in income inequality in Germany was one of the highest 
among EU member states, again from a lower level than the European 
average but even more than in Greece.  
The only exception among the selected indicators is earnings capacity poverty 
measured as the percent of the population living in households with low 
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employment intensity. Measured by this indicator German performance improved, 
which is probably a reflection of the strong quantitative inclusion impact of 
German employment policy.   
So, is there an unavoidable tradeoff between quantitative and qualitative 
inclusion? The task of the final section develops the idea of an inclusive labour 
contract which could be the solution to overcome the tradeoff and to develop a 
virtuous (instead of a vicious circle) between quantitative and qualitative 
inclusion.  
3.2 The inclusive labour contract as regulatory idea 
The main message of the previous sections and developed in more details in a 
forthcoming book47 is that we should embrace non-standard employment (NSE) as 
an opportunity rather than as a danger. The consequence of this view, however, is 
a responsibility of policymakers to ensure there are new institutional capacities 
that provide social protection for people engaging in these risky employment 
relationships, increasing in particular in terms of working time flexibility over the 
life course, statistically reflected imperfectly in the rising phenomen of part-time 
work. 
So far, the dangerous elements of risks related to NSE have been emphasised: 
precarious and dead-end jobs, rising inequality and segmentation. This view is 
certainly justified by the facts, but I hope to have added and justified a more 
optimistic view by pointing to the opportunity elements of risks related to NSE, 
that is, enhancing productivity through increasing the variability of employment 
relationships and greater sovereignty of workers for choosing the most suitable 
form of employment relationship over the life course with changing needs and 
preferences. The provocative news from the empirical part of the underlying study 
to this essay is the observation that it is voluntary part-time in particular (taken as 
an indicator of working-time flexibility over the life course) which seems to be an 
important driver for a new ‘marriage’ of equity and efficiency in the digital 
economy.48 Furthermore, Europe should not dismiss the labour market complexity 
of the global world around its small continent which is, to a large extent, still 
strongly characterised by informal employment relationships with low social 
protection.49 
Embracing more contractual complexity requires enhanced institutional capacities 
to respond to the new challenges of fair risk-sharing at three levels: the legal, the 
financial and the organisational level. At the legal level, a new labour standard 
based on the idea of an effective right to decent work (RDW) beyond formal 
                                                 
47 Schmid (2018a), Schmid (2018b), Schmid/Wagner (2017, 2018). 
48 See in particular tables 9 and 10 in Schmid (2018b).  
49 See aso ILO (2016) and Schmid (2018a). 
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employment might be the solution. At the financial level, social protection – in a 
digital economy – may rely less on wage-based contributions and more on general 
taxation (including capital gains, wealth and luxurious consumption). At the 
organisational level, negotiated flexicurity and effective labour market services 
are at the core, like smart-matching demand and supply, monitoring and 
evaluation, case management based on individualized assessment, continuous 
training and vocational education, co-financing implemented within modern 
governance structures such as co-determination and participation in investment 
decisions. Germany, as shown above, provides some good practices in this 
respect. 
As far as the legal level is concerned, expanding the range of the labour contract 
to all forms of work, also including unpaid but socially highly valued work as 
proposed, for instance, by the Supiot Report,50 seems to be the most radical and 
promising route for ensuring social protection to workers. The main aim is the 
move from protecting jobs to protecting the employability of people, or from job 
security to labour market security.51 Social security linked to traditional 
employment relationships would be extended in the new standard to include 
income and employment risks related to transitions between various employment 
and labour market statuses. The legal core is the establishment of new social 
rights and new social obligations on both sides of the labour market. 
The coverage of the social rights would be new in that they would include 
subjects that are unfamiliar to industrial wage-earners on which the traditional 
standard employment relationship is built: the right to regular employability 
assessment, to appropriate working hours including the right to request shorter 
working hours, to a family life, to occupational redeployment, retraining or 
vocational rehabilitation. Furthermore, a flexible job guarantee through the state 
would be an accompanying element.52 In contrast to earlier job guarantees, this 
guarantee would be flexible in three respects: First, individuals would be free to 
choose a job offer by the state. Second, individuals could combine this right with 
various ‘non-standard’ forms of employment, e.g. involuntary part-time. Third, 
the guarantee could also take the form of subsidised employment in the (private) 
market sector. This right is also an immediate conclusion from the insight that 
employment has not only instrumental but also intrinsic features, including also – 
as emphasised against the idea of UBI – the challenge to take personal risks. 
Providing job opportunities can, for instance, take youth out of their ‘natural’ 
neighbourhood and eliminate, at least for a certain time, the often negative effects 
of peer groups in disadvantaged environments. 
                                                 
50 Supiot (2011/2016). 
51 See also, among others, Auer/Gazier (2006). 
52 Atkinson (2015), pp. 140–7. 
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The scope of social rights would also be new since they would include not only 
‘standard’ wage-earners but also the ‘non-standard’ part-time workers, the self-
employed or semi-self-employed, the temp-agency workers, the marginal 
workers, and even zero-hour contract workers. One example would be including 
the risk of reduced earnings capacity in a way analogue to short-time work (of 
full-time workers) covered by unemployment insurance. The income loss induced 
by reduced working time (due to, for example, care obligations) could be 
compensated by part-time unemployment benefits or – as in the German case – a 
wage-related parental leave allowance. Such a benefit would also be helpful when 
related to the increasing demand of care for the frail and elderly which, for 
example in Germany, in its majority (three-fourths) is still provided within the 
family and again predominantly by women. 
The nature of social rights would be new because they often take the form of 
vouchers, social drawing rights or personnel accounts, which provide transition 
securities from one labour contract to another and allow workers to rely on 
solidarity within defined and perhaps collectively bargained limits when 
exercising their new freedom to act.  
A good practice example of such coordinated flexibility is the German collective 
agreement established in the chemical industry in April 2008, setting up so-called 
demography funds. This overall framework agreement required all employers to 
contribute an annual sum of 300 Euro for each employee into a fund, which could 
be utilised after corresponding negotiations and deliberations at the firm level for 
various aims, among others for training or retraining, for buying occupational 
disability insurance or for early retirement, however, under the condition of 
building a bridge for young workers entering employment. In 2015, instead of 
bargaining for an aggressive wage increase, trade unions successfully fought for a 
stepwise increase of employers’ contributions into this fund: 550 Euro in 2016 
and 750 Euro in 2017, corresponding to an otherwise 0.9 percent wage increase.    
To the extent that these new rights enhance the range of individual choices, a 
corresponding new field of individual responsibilities opens up. This dimension,  
strangely enough, is not covered in the Supiot Report. Amartya Sen, however, is 
quite outspoken in this respect: “Freedom to choose gives us the opportunity to 
decide what we should do, but with the opportunity comes the responsibility for 
what we do – to the extent that they are chosen actions. Since a capability is the 
power to do something, the accountability that emanates from that ability – that 
power – is a part of the capability perspective, and this can make room for 
demands of duty – what can be broadly called deontological demands.”53  
The coverage of social obligations arising from the extended room of individual 
freedom to act would be new in that they would include subjects unfamiliar in the 
                                                 
53 Sen (2009, p. 19). 
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traditional employment relationship: obligations to train and retrain both for 
employees as well as for employers to maintain employability; to actively search 
for a new job or accept a less well paid job under fair compensating rules; to 
healthy lifestyles and occupational rehabilitation; to reasonable workplace 
adjustments according to the capabilities of workers or to changing working times 
according to the needs either related to the individual life course or to volatile 
market demands of goods and services. A good example in this direction are the 
reforms of the German law for severely disabled people, which have been 
described above. It is evident that these kinds of adjustment duties require support 
through collective agreements or social pacts between firms and other key actors 
in the local or regional labour market with the support of modern labour market 
services, which are still underdeveloped in Germany. 
The scope of social obligations would also be new since they would include not 
only certain categories of workers or employers but also the core workers in open-
ended contracts and all firms regardless of size and function. The exemption of 
civil servants or the self-employed from contributing to social security (especially 
pensions and unemployment insurance) as, for instance, in Germany, would not 
be justified under the regulatory idea of an inclusive labour contract. A good 
practice example is the obligation to work-share in the event of cyclical troughs of 
demand if workers’ representatives (Betriebsrat) require this from the employer 
whereby, in turn, the law entitles them to ask employers to work-share as an 
instrument to maintain the employment relationship. The German scheme of 
short-time work (Kurzarbeit) demonstrates the usefulness of such a device for 
internal flexibility as well as the need to fine-tune the contractual arrangements.54  
The nature of social obligations would be new because they often take the form of 
‘voice’, involving negotiations at individual, firm, regional and branch level in 
order to reach mutual agreements and to accept compromises in case of different 
interests, so-called negotiated flexicurity.55 As many workers in NSFE have a 
limited voice, it is important to include measures that can strengthen their ability 
to be heard and to negotiate effectively. Voice as an adjustment mechanism to 
structural change involving high uncertainty is known in the literature on 
industrial relations as legally acknowledged learning communities. Covenants are 
a good practice case, which – for instance – are widely used as a governance 
instrument in the Netherlands. A covenant is an undersigned written agreement, or 
a system of agreements, between two or more parties, at least one that is or 
represents a public authority, meant to effectuate governmental policy. There is no 
single format of a covenant, but they share common features: enough overlapping 
interests of participants, mechanisms bringing about both definition and the 
machinery of achievements. The parties cooperate and formal sanctions are 
absent, yet parties have the opportunity to go to court should one party default. 
                                                 
54 See for instance Möller (2010), Schmid (2015: 84–6); Storrie (2012). 
55 Schmid (2008:317–22). 
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Covenants could also be understood as a “pressure” or “incentive” mechanism for 
coordination to economise on the most scarce and strategic resource, that is, the 
ability to take adequate decisions and to avoid the decision traps of collective 
good production in uncertain environments.56 
To sum up: The challenge of NSE could be taken as a chance to design a roadmap 
guided by the regulatory idea of an inclusive labour contract. New social rights 
and obligations under this systemic reorientation would increase the internal 
flexibility of ‘standard’ employment as a functional equivalent to external 
flexibility which often ends up in a precarious NSE. But they would also include 
voluntary forms of NSE in a broader social protection framework as currently 
exists, for instance, by extending the conventional unemployment insurance to a 
system of employment insurance which also covers income risks other than 
unemployment, such as voluntary or involuntary part-time or short-time work. 
The establishment of new social rights and new social obligations according to the 
regulatory idea of an inclusive labour contract would also ensure the development 
of institutional capabilities that not only make workers fit to the market, but that 
also make the market fit to the workers.57 The employment strategy of inclusive 
growth should be based on the regulatory idea of a new labour standard which 
goes beyond employment and includes all kinds of work that are socially valued 
or even obligatory. The inclusive labour contract brings together the supply 
strategy of investments in human capabilities over the whole life course, and the 
demand strategy of inclusive growth through job creation by proper fiscal and 
monetary policies enhanced by the protected variability of labour contracts. This 
would also be an essential element of a global social policy58 that aims at the 
prevention of a vicious cycle or cut-throat global competition, originally described  
by the socialist political activist, Ferdinand Lassalle, as the iron law of falling real 
net wages towards an existence minimum.59 
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